Contextualism and the History of Philosophy by Paterson, Craig
 1 







Philosophy, as a discipline, often tends to view its subject mat-
ter in abstract and ahistorical terms. Concepts are often 
assumed to be ‘fixed’ in meaning across many centuries of 
thought, and their historical change is often neglected. The 
transmission and reception of ideas is commonly conceived 
of in terms of a chain of connected dialogue that revolves 
around an established canon of great intellectual thinkers dis-
cussing great philosophical works, divorced from contextual-
historical influences. While there has been, in the wider acad-
emy, a movement for the ‘history of ideas’ as an approach to 
intellectual history, this movement has tended to function as a 
separate discipline and has failed to make much of an impres-
sion in the interpretative methodology typically pursued by 
philosophers in analytical philosophy departments. Attention 
to historical inquiry, it is often thought, tends to ‘dilute’ or ‘cor-
rupt’ the genuine spirit of philosophical inquiry by corrosively 
attacking its dedication to the universal (perennial validity), 
the abstract (departicularization), and the heroic (philosopher 
contra mundi).1 The minds of several generations of students 
of philosophy, raised in the Anglo-American analytical tradi-
tion, are marked with a lesson from the 18th century idealist 
philosopher Immanuel Kant who castigated those “scholarly 
men, to whom the history of philosophy (both ancient and 
modern) is philosophy itself.”2 For Kant, the search for the 
transcendental foundations of all reality necessitated 
                                                                
1 This, for example, is very much the kind of position taken by Bertrand Rus-
sell, a leading influence in contemporary analytical philosophy. See Russell 
on Metaphysics: Selections from the Writings of Bertrand Russell. Stephen 
Mumford ed. (London: Routledge, 2003). For another example typical of this 
kind of de-contextualized approach to philosophical history, see also An-
thony Flew’s, An Introduction to Western Philosophy: Ideas and Argument 
from Plato to Popper (London: Thames and Hudson, 1989). 
2 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena, trans. Paul Carus (Chicago: Open Court, 
1993), p. 1. 
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discounting concerns about how a proposition came to be 
formed as a mere distraction from a proposition’s epistemo-
logical status (a concern shared by contemporary analytical 
philosophy—philosophers are not mere “curators in the mu-
seum of ideas”).3 
 The above picture is, of course, something of a distortion 
of my own creation. Most philosophers are aware that ideas 
do not just spring forth miraculously from the mind of a philos-
opher, and therefore accord to philosophy the need for some 
kind of historical connectivity. But the attention to historical 
context is one that is often understood in terms of a kind of 
history that we may call ‘idealized history.’ Idealized history is 
the history of great minds battling with the perennial ideas of 
other great minds, in one long continuous great and noble 
conversation, removed from the taint of more particular con-
cerns. The kind of historical understanding operative here 
often amounts to little more than a discussion of broad philo-
sophical doctrines organized into chronological time slots 
allotted to the great philosophers, and fleshed out, for good 
measure, with some ‘human interest’ stories. History of phi-
losophy, in short, is often viewed as something amounting to 
hagiography. 
 This tendency towards ahistoricism (even anti-histori-
cism), still very prevalent in the mindset of contemporary 
analytical philosophy, needs, I think, to be challenged by a 
form of approach that stresses the ‘contextually mediated’ na-
ture of much philosophical thinking and writing. We need, in 
short, to focus upon an approach to understanding human 
thought processes that channels our attention to how the hu-
man mind is strongly influenced by, and reacts to, the 
‘ideational ecology’ it inhabits—a complex web made up of 
various kinds of intellectual, cultural, and social networks that 
are closely woven into the thought processes of any given 
thinker. 
 In this paper, I seek to advance the thesis that if we are 
to come to a better appreciation of the historical rootedness 
of philosophical thinking, we must strive to encourage the 
                                                                
3 D.S. Hutchinson, The Virtues of Aristotle (London: Routledge, 1986), p. 
12. 
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contextualization of philosophical texts and support this goal 
by developing methods and tools for research that are facili-
tative of this contextualist goal. 
 In my analysis of this thesis, I will first turn to a discussion 
of some of the conceptual issues that underpin the need for 
philosophers to understand, and apply to the history of philos-
ophy, better interpretative practices. The analysis will draw 
upon helpful developments that have occurred in ordinary lan-
guage philosophy, a ‘post-analytical’ philosophical approach 
conceptually more amenable to contextualist historical inter-
pretation. I will also draw upon helpful developments in literary 
theory that offer useful insights into the analysis of texts that 
also seem applicable to the study of philosophical texts. 
 Secondly, I will then seek to advance the case for the 
thesis by focusing on a case example, John Locke and his 
Two Treatises of Government, that illustrates, by way of a via 
negativa, the problems of distortion and error in attempting to 
interpret philosophical texts with little regard for context. 
 Thirdly, I will address the question of why unhistorical 
forms of approach to the history of philosophy continue to be 
perpetuated within the ranks of contemporary practitioners of 
philosophy, tracing this problem to the inculturation practices 
that typify the academy bound profession of Anglo-American 
philosophy. 
 Lastly, by way of conclusion, I will set about the task of 
examining some issues pertaining to the development of re-
source-based initiatives designed to better facilitate historical 
based scholarship in philosophy, resources that will furnish 
the philosopher with a better array of tools for the develop-
ment of their research, for example, digital libraries of primary 
source documents. 
 
The Significance of Contextualism 
While I do not intend this paper to be an exercise in philoso-
phy, I wish to illustrate some conceptual ways in which 
philosophy itself may fruitfully respond to the kinds of concern 
that I have highlighted in my introduction. This legacy has now 
been coming under fire for a number of years, in particular, 
with the retreat of the hitherto very dominant influences of 
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both empiricism and positivism in analytical philosophy. In a 
forthright essay by Stephen Turner, the author berates mod-
ern analytical philosophy for its lack of historical character, 
arguing that a contextualist understanding of philosophy’s 
own history is itself an indispensable part of any adequate 
philosophy. Turner identifies two helpful turns in philosophy, 
the turn away from empiricism, and the turn away from posi-
tivism, as offering some weak rays of hope in support of his 
plea for a broad contextualist approach to the study of the his-
tory of philosophy.4 
 Firstly, the anti-empiricist turn. Empiricism, the belief in 
sense data which are capable of being directly perceived and 
embodied in a non-interpretative observation language, has 
been undermined by, amongst others, W.V.O. Quine, and 
Paul Feyerabend. Quine, and Feyerabend have deeply chal-
lenged the belief that we can gather a structure of empirical 
knowledge that is independent of our own evaluative judg-
ments that mediates the interaction of the human mind with 
the word around it. 
 Secondly, the anti-positivist turn. Another helpful turn has 
been the questioning of the credo of positivism that meaning-
ful statements must refer to facts, and that the meaning of a 
sentence must be demonstrated by its method of verification 
in order to establish its truth content. The main challenge to 
this key idea of logical positivism was the later work of the 
Cambridge philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Philosoph-
ical Investigations.5 In the Investigations, he asserted the 
famous injunction not to ask directly about the abstract mean-
ing of propositions but rather about how they are used in 
particular “language games.”6 The underlying assumption of 
this approach—that the analysis of meaning needs to be con-
nected with the use of language for purposes of 
communication—has been further refined by the Cambridge 
ordinary language philosopher John Austin and his theory of 
                                                                
4 Stephen Turner, “Teaching Subtlety of Thought: The Lessons of Contextu-
alism,” Argumentation 15(1) (2001): 77-95. 
5 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. 
Anscombe (London: Macmillan, 1958). 
6 Wittgenstein’s earlier work, for example, his Tracatus Logico-Philosophi-
cus, was highly positivistic. 
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“speech acts.” Austin, in developing his theory of speech acts, 
proposed that the “utterance itself,” whether verbal or written, 
in short, the words divorced from their context, is a “locution,” 
and a locution can only be understood by exploring the locu-
tion in context.7 
 
Contribution of Literary Theory 
Literary theorists seem to have embraced some of the subtler 
lessons of ordinary language philosophy more fully that many 
writers in the history of philosophy. In consequence, literary 
theory has, on the whole, been more directly aware of, and 
keener to apply, ways of textual analysis that meaningfully re-
late the text to a wider context of conventions and 
assumptions. These conventions and assumptions shape a 
text, and give a text a context which serves to relate the parts 
of the text, its utterances, patterns, and forms of words, to a 
meaningful frame of reference that does not seek to divorce 
the text from the social, political, and cultural contexts that in-
fluence its ideational content. 
 Unlike much writing in the history of philosophy that has 
been produced (though not without some notable exceptions), 
it is common for literary theory to delve into the different 
senses in which it is possible to flesh out the background of a 
given text, and to make it clear that their main concern is with 
a weaved context of meanings. There is, consequently, more 
awareness of, and resistance to, the problem of post-hoc ra-
tionalizations of contemporary concepts being stamped onto 
the past writings of a given thinker in what amounts to the 
‘cookie-cutter’ fashioning of a text. 
 It is not possible to find out what a philosopher meant 
simply by studying his or her written statements (a ‘just look 
at the text’ approach) in isolation from the milieu of the author 
of the text. The kinds of questions that the author is address-
ing and communicating to the reader need to be examined. In 
other words, it is not possible to understand what has been 
said in a text until the detailed and specific questions being 
engaged by a text, and by the author’s agenda in writing it, 
                                                                
7 J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1975). 
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are scrutinized. The emphasis, however, needs to be on the 
detailed and specific questions relevant to an author, defi-
nitely not the practice of attempting to link an author to some 
general ‘meta-question’ supposedly abstracted from any 
place in time. Instead, questions should be related to the spe-
cific context in which a given written expression was being 
made. 
 
Interpretative Meaning and Evaluation 
The need to separate contextual approaches to the study of 
the history of philosophy from unhistorical approaches, can 
be further clarified, here, I think, by stating that the job of a 
historical approach to philosophy is to be aware of the need 
to identify two distinct types of concern, and not to seamlessly 
merge the two distinct types of concern together into a hybrid 
conflation of the two (as difficult, as it is, at times, to put this 
into practice). Of the writings of any author in the past (or in-
deed the present), it is possible to firstly explore the notion 
“what did the author say and mean by this statement?” and 
secondly, given our exploration of the first question, the sec-
ond question can then start be addressed, “given that A meant 
B … in what sense can the statement be said to be true or 
not?” The first question addresses the genesis of an idea in 
context. The second question, building on the first, goes on to 
address the epistemological status of a proposition as it was 
likely held by a given philosopher. The second question does 
not just confine itself to the accurate representation of an idea 
but addresses the valuational status of an idea.8 
 The effects of the work of Wittgenstein and Austin, 
among others, working in the philosophy of language, has 
been to help focus our attention on the role of factors like 
                                                                
8 One of the clearest statements I have read by a philosopher concerning 
questions of textual interpretation, one that stresses the importance of re-
specting this twofold distinction, was made by Alistair MacIntyre in a paper 
written on the interpretation of a key passage in David Hume’s Treatise on 
Human Nature—”There are, of course, two distinct issues raised by this pa-
per so far. There is the historical question of what Hume is actually 
asserting in the passage under discussion (Treatise Bk. III Sect. I Pt. I), and 
there is the philosophical question of whether what he does assert is [both] 
true and important.” See his “Hume on Is and Ought,” Philosophical Review 
68 (1959): 451-68. 
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utterances, intention, and contextual linguistic background, in 
trying to come to terms with the possible meaning of a philo-
sophical text. This represents something of a move towards 
an appreciation of the methodology seen in the hermeneutic 
analysis of literary texts and promises to be a useful avenue 
for the cross-fertilization of ideas among ‘post-analytic’ philos-
ophers and literary theorists. 
 A salutary lesson to be learned from literary theory for 
the analysis of philosophical texts, acknowledged and sup-
ported, as I have said, by some leading work in ordinary 
language philosophy, is that the genuinely meaningful analy-
sis of a text must place the given text of a thinker against a 
weave of human conventions, expectations, and practices 
that crucially inform the meaning of a text (or at least delimit, 
in a boundary setting way, the array of meanings that can be 
usefully inferred). Such a lesson for philosophy would, of 
course, be easier to absorb and put into practice if it were not 
for what Richard Rorty has identified as the skewing that oc-
curs in the philosophers’ perception of their own discipline as 
the ‘queen of the sciences’, exalted above all others, with its 
quest for the indubitable foundations of all reality. This inflated 
sense of the status of philosophy among the disciplines, tends 
to result in a kind of ‘imperial myopia,’ discounting the contri-
bution that other disciplines can make to understanding the 
contextual development of its own subject matter. The disci-
pline itself, if it is to open itself up to historical inquiry, based 
on context, must face up to the sobering thought that philos-
ophers are all too ready to turn their “local fallible [i.e. 
contingent, historically conditioned] canons of argument into 
a set of imperishable truths.”9 
 
John Locke and His Two Treatises 
As I argued in the preceding section, if the writing of the 
history of philosophy is to move to the terrain of non-
hagiographical or non-mythological forms of writing, and 
wishes instead to proceed to understand the subtleties of an 
array of different factors that impinge on the mind of a 
                                                                
9 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, 1979), p. 48 
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philosophical thinker and his or her production of a given 
philosophical text, then contextualism needs to be embraced 
in the pursuit of scholarly research. 
 In order to concretize some of the interpretative 
problems referred to in the preceding discussion, and to 
illustrate why a contextualist approach to the history of 
philosophy is so crucial, I will now turn to an examination of a 
concrete case—John Locke’s Two Treatises of 
Government—an example that, I think, well demonstrates 
why contextualism as a methodological approach (facilitated 
by the development of research tools facilitating good 
contextualist practice), is so sorely needed in this discipline. 
 John Locke was a 17th century philosopher and political 
writer. His reputation as an innovator of philosophical ideas is 
centered on two of his main texts—An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, and the Two Treatises. The first text 
is held by philosophers to secure his place in the philosophical 
canon as the founding father of modern empiricism. The 
second text is held to secure his place as the founding father 
of modern liberalism with his theory of the consent of the 
governed (the latter text being my main focus for discussion). 
 Let me state it plainly here that I am not concerned to 
argue that Locke was not a great thinker or that his works are 
not works of considerable intellectual merit. That would be a 
fool’s errand. Rather, I seek to argue that many myths have 
grown up about this thinker (spurred on by unhistorical, 
acontextual practices), myths that inevitably distort our 
understanding of the actual thoughts of this thinker. In what 
follows, I seek to show how these myths can be ‘debunked,’ 
and can best be avoided by a thoroughgoing attentiveness to 
good contextualist practice. 
Myth Number One 
Date of composition and purpose behind composition. Many 
standard texts in the history of philosophy continue to herald 
the writing of Locke’s Two Treatises’ as a post-hoc 
justification for the ‘Glorious Revolution’ in England of 1688, 
a ‘revolution’ that saw the deposition of the catholic King 
James II & VII and his subsequent replacement by the 
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protestant King William III, of Orange.10 The main evidence 
for this claim, an ideological claim, attempting to show how 
England at the time was motivated by the desire to instantiate 
and apply rational principles of representative government, is 
based on the wording of the preface to the original edition of 
the text, combined with the fact that the text was first 
published in 1690, some two years after the events of 1688.11 
 The problem with this claim, however, is that it cannot be 
reconciled with other weighty evidence that the text could not 
have been written for that declared purpose. When judged 
against contrary evidence, the claim functions as something 
of a ‘rationalization’ on the part of Locke, because it directs 
the reader’s attention away from the actual circumstances 
and timing of the writing of the text. The express reasons that 
motivated this rationalization are not discernable for there is 
no correspondence on this matter. On a conjectural note, 
however, congruent with other evidence about Locke’s 
‘shrewd character,’ perhaps this prefacatory statement was 
written in order to capitalize on a potential market for the book, 
benefiting from a turn in political events (not least, Locke’s 
own return from exile in Holland), a turn that created a niche 
for a well crafted text, that would, from a Whig perspective, 
act as an intellectual apologia for the ‘logic’ of the revolution.12 
 The lesson from a simple analysis of the text alone 
(especially prefacatory material), is to be wary of overt claims 
as to purpose, and carefully scrutinize them, for they may be 
rationalizations distorting the actual context that informed the 
writing of a given text. Locke’s main aim in writing his Two 
Treatises, was not to justify to the world the throne of William 
III and the successful revolution of 1688, but, rather, to enlist 
cadres in a political conflict that had gripped England some 
seven to nine years earlier (the ‘exclusionist’ controversy that 
                                                                
10 For example, David Hamlyn, Being a Philosopher: The History of a Prac-
tice (London: Routledge, 1992). 
11 John Locke, Preface to his Two Treatises “… to establish the Throne of 
our Great Restorer, Our present King William; and to make good his Title, in 
the Consent of the People … And to justify to the World, the People of Eng-
land, whose love of their Just and Natural Rights, with their Resolution to 
preserve them, saved the Nation when it was on the very brink of Slavery 
and Ruine.” 
12 On Locke’s character, see Maurice Cranston, Locke. London: Longmans 
Green, 1961. 
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tried, unsuccessfully, to change the line of succession to the 
English throne). 
 
Myth Number Two 
The myth that Locke wrote two separate works, not one. Part 
of the myth behind Locke’s writing of the Two Treatises, as an 
exercise justifying the revolution of 1688, is spurred on by the 
supposition that Locke really wrote two quite independent 
works, not one—the first work being: The False Principles and 
Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer …, and the second work 
being: An Essay Concerning the True, Original, Extent, and 
End of Civil Government. If the works are essentially 
independent then why is it not reasonable to suppose that the 
second treatise, at least, was written around 1689-1690? (No 
one seriously argues that the first work was not written during 
the years 1680-1681, a time during which Filmer’s absolutist 
text—Patriarcha—enjoyed considerable popularity and 
influence.) 
 The ‘independent nature’ view of the two works has been 
facilitated by the subsequent printing history of the Two 
Treatises. It is usual to publish the Essay separately and 
isolate it from any connectedness to a refutation of the work 
of Sir Robert Filmer (with the first treatise seldom being 
published). Yet, this turn, of effectively isolating the text away 
from its natural literary companion, is akin to severing a part 
of a work from its contextual setting within a congruent whole.  
 The contextual evidence paints a different picture as to 
the dates of writing. The language and conceptual linkages 
between the two texts are very close. As John Dunn argues, 
the interwoven ideational dependency of the two works is 
such as to discount, in the case of the Essay, a period of eight 
or nine years of delayed authorship.13 The intimacy that exists 
between the two works is falsely iterated to modern eyes by 
a literary and publishing device of the period, namely, the 
labeling of the two treatises as separate books. Historically, 
this was often merely used as a device for splitting up a large 
                                                                
13 John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of 
the Argument of the ‘Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), p. 23. 
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work into different main sections, for reasons of 
convenience.14 
 Bowers, Gerritsen, and Laslett, analytical bibliographers, 
have analyzed, in detail, the printing history behind the two 
books.15 They have demonstrated that the title-page of the 
second book, in its original printing of 1690, was a later 
insertion, and was not part of the original print design. They 
have further demonstrated that the title-page of the whole 
work was then altered, at a later date, so as to reflect the 
subsequent incorporation of a secondary title-page for the 
second book. The phrase “two treatises” itself was actually a 
post-hoc creation incorporated by the printers into a revised 
title-page for the two books. Bowers, Gerritsen, and Laslett 
effectively illustrate the point that the way in which a text is 
physically presented can later influence how a whole work 
can be severed into its constituent parts (and, presumably, 
also, using the same methods of analytical bibliography, how 
genuinely separate texts can also appear as parts of a single 
common work).16 
 
Myth Number Three 
Thomas Hobbes, the rational defender of monarchical abso-
lutism, par excellence, was the principal interlocutor of the 
Two Treatises. As I have said earlier, philosophers are fond of 
the vision of philosophy as a continuous conversation of great 
minds, across the ages, engaging one another in the battle-
field of ideas. Like ‘fantasy football league,’ they want their 
heroes and foes to be a part of a ‘common fixture,’ even if that 
fixture exists only in the imagination; the fixture being a battle 
between two great social contract theorists who reached rad-
ically different conclusions as to the ends and purpose of civil 
government. Yet, fiction is not fact, even if the conceptual 
edges (in an era of deconstruction) are blurry, and there is 
little evidence to suppose that Locke had Hobbes in his sight 
                                                                
14 On the stylistic development of literary forms in print culture, see D.F. 
MacKenzie’s Biblioigraphy and the Sociology of Texts (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1999). 
15 Freson Bowers, Johan Gerritsen, and Peter Laslett, “Further Observa-
tions on Locke’s Two Treatises,” Transactions of the Cambridge 
Bibliographical Society 2(1) (1954): 20-26. 
16 Ibid. 
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when he wrote the Two Treatises. On the contrary, the war-
rantable evidence points to Sir Robert Filmer as the main 
interlocutor of John Locke. Filmer’s Patriarcha, because it 
purported to show how royal authority was biblically rooted in 
Adam, was therefore more amenable to the sensibilities of the 
population in England at the time than Hobbes’ logically 
tighter but colder analysis of the necessity for absolutist power 
in the form of Leviathan. The question of interlocutor is im-
portant because the creation of an ‘artificial dialogue’ between 
these two thinkers helps to de-contextualize Locke’s thought 
away from the sources that helped to inform the genesis of 
his ideas. Reading Locke through the lens of commentary on 
Hobbes, colors our understanding of the relationship between 
Locke’s work and its relationship to the interstices of political 
debate in 17th century English society. 
 Several arguments point against the ‘ideal fixture’ of 
Locke versus Hobbes. Firstly, there is only one reference to 
Hobbes’ work directly in the Two Treatises. Secondly, the pre-
cise language of textual debate does not center around a 
close association between the two thinkers. Locke was not 
engaged in writing a ‘polemic’ against Hobbes’ highly ration-
alistic justification for absolutism in Leviathan. If he were, he 
would surely have made more reference to it and linked his 
argumentation more carefully to an attempted refutation of its 
core arguments. (Locke was ‘tight’ with his analysis of ideas 
and would have directed his attention more fully if he had 
Hobbes’ work in mind.) Thirdly, Hobbes’ own reputation at the 
time was of a comparatively minor nature. The cult of appro-
priation of his text Leviathan had not yet begun in earnest. 
Fourthly, the first of the two books written was expressly di-
rected against the arguments of Filmer’s Patriarcha.17 
 Am I, therefore, seemingly against any form of compari-
son of the two texts produced by two very different thinkers? 
No. A comparison of the thoughts of both thinkers, as an ex-
ercise in philosophical dialectic, of seeing what congruencies, 
dis-congruencies, and different possibilities of approach may 
emerge from a comparison of both thinkers, is important to 
                                                                
17 Richard Ashcraft, “John Locke’s Library: Portrait of an Intellectual,” Trans-
actions of the Cambridge Bibliographical Society 5 (1) (1969): 47-60. 
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the practice of philosophy. Notice here, however, that my fo-
cus of attention has shifted from the first area of inquiry—what 
was meant by a given author in a given text?, to the second 
area of inquiry, namely—what follows from our subsequent 
analysis of that delimited meaning? Given that A meant B, 
how does A’s use of the concept differ from C’s use of A? Is 
C’s use of the concept really the same concept as A? Given 
that A means B, is it true?—and so on. 
 Misrepresentations often come about by an interpreter’s 
assumption that the problem he or she is addressing, is the 
same as the problem the original author was addressing, 
when it is not the same problem. Correction of the misrepre-
sentation due to misunderstanding can be accomplished, very 
often, by adopting a less cavalier attitude to the text and by 
paying closer attention to its proper context. When we start to 
engage in philosophical speculation, it is good contextualist 
practice to be cautiously aware of the different kinds of appro-
priation of a text, for present purposes, that we can engage 
upon. Often, with good contextualist practice, we may be 
force to revise our attribution of ideas from X argued for Y, to, 
Y is an idea that I have, that I want to defend, inspired by or 
indebted to my reading of Y …. 
 
Myth Number Four 
Locke was a consistent thinker, ergo, he was consistent, mi-
nor peccadilloes aside, in everything he wrote. It is often 
tempting in philosophy to opt for explanations of texts that 
gravitate towards coherence and consistency. These are, 
rightly, considered to be highly desirable qualities in philo-
sophical thinking. Interpreters, motivated by sympathy, often 
lean towards this tendency. Yet, I would argue against any 
wholesale attempt to unduly privilege consistency of interpre-
tation by thinking of it as a purely neutral form of interpretative 
device, for it is often blind as to context (as is the opposite 
tendency, when attacking a thinker, of generating inconsisten-
cies, often through the device of crafty word-play). We should, 
in short, try and appreciate that two different forms of ap-
proach stand in danger of being muddled: a shift from the 
interpretative—did A recognize a contradiction in his or her 
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thought? or was A (implicitly) operating with a contradic-
tion?—to the appropriative—on the basis of A’s work, how can 
we overcome the contradiction? how can we, with additional 
insights, improve upon A’s thought? 
 Alas, in the battle for reputation, and also in philosophy’s 
quasi-religious reverencing of the reputation of its past greats, 
conjoined with the philosophical desire to want to either save 
or condemn a thinker due to charges of inconsistency, the 
conditions become ripe for the creation of distortion through 
partiality. 
 If we attempt to impose, in high German fashion, a logic 
of vigorous consistency across the corpus of Locke’s writing, 
we will greatly distort the different and disparate influences 
that informed different facets of his work. Locke was not able 
to reconcile his work in epistemology (Essay on Human Un-
derstanding) with his foundations for political theory (Two 
Treatises), nor is there any evidence that he attempted to do 
so, for he made little attempt to create any express linkages 
between these two areas of philosophical inquiry. The latter, 
for Locke, was informed by a different milieu and a very differ-
ent method of approach. Many grand overarching attempts to 
interpret both texts as one large exercise in continuous writ-
ing, held constantly in the mind, run the risk of gravely 
distorting the meaning of both texts. This, alas, is what Leo 
Strauss attempted to do in his Natural Rights and History. 
Strauss, anxious to find a justification for Locke’s ‘paired’ 
down commitment to natural law theory, compared to its 
Scholastic forms, attributed this to Locke’s skeptical episte-
mology concerning the possibility of knowing the essences of 
natural kinds. A more limited capacity to know essences 
equals a more limited content to the natural law. 18 
 This is an erroneous interpretation, however, charged by 
the desire to seek consistency across the board of Locke’s 
thought. It involves a major distortion of his political thought to 
make the fit. In his search for consistency, Strauss repre-
sented Locke’s commitment to natural law theory as a paired 
down version of full-blown natural law theory, thus more able 
                                                                
18 Leo Strauss, Natural Rights and History (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1953). 
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to be reconciled with Locke’s skepticism concerning our ability 
to now the essence of natural kinds. Whilst it is accurate to 
say that Locke’s theory of natural law theory was substantially 
different from Scholastic forms, it was not simply a chopped 
down form of the latter. His theory of a law of nature had more 
flesh on its bones than that. Strauss sought to minimize the 
content of Locke’s commitment to natural law theory in order 
to help with the consistency objective. Yet, Strauss did not ad-
equately familiarize himself with the religious context of 
Locke’s Christianity and the way this functioned as a source 
that inspired many of his political claims.19  
 Locke the political philosopher and strategist is not 
merely Locke the epistemologist transplanted into a different 
terrain. Locke, so to speak, in the ‘political arena,’ claims far 
more for the power of human reason, and also for divine 
sources of knowledge, than Locke the epistemologist would 
permit given his defense of our limited sources of empirical 
knowledge (the mind being a tabula rasa, with no inner power 
via adequation to comprehend the natural essences of 
things). The central problem, in the first place, is to attempt to 
create a neat rational fit between Locke’s epistemology and 
what he was prepared to make use of (in terms of knowledge 
gained and assumed) in other contexts of discourse. 
 
Myth Number Five 
The myth of the lonely creator-genius. As I have already 
stated, it is not my intention here to argue that the Locke of 
laurelled reputation was not a thinker of prodigious talent. His 
Two Treatises is a highly accomplished work. Rather, what I 
do seek to argue is that his creative talent, when viewed 
against the period of his writing, is not so startlingly original as 
we might think, and indeed, when viewed contextually, is 
much more heavily dependent on the work of ‘lesser’ thinkers, 
                                                                
19 Consider, for example, Locke’s religious justification for the basic equality 
of persons in the state of nature, prior to civil government: “Creatures of the 
same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of 
Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one 
amongst another, without Subordination or Subjection, unless the Lord and 
Master of them all should, by any manifest Declaration of his Will, set one 
above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an 
undoubted Right to Dominion and sovereignty.” 2nd Treatise, para. 4. 
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as well as the general political cultural air of the time, than is 
generally thought. 
 A clue to the way in which Locke’s text was less original 
or revolutionary than we might think, looking at the work in 
isolation, and relating it to an idealized pantheon of great 
texts, is that the work was treated somewhat indifferently by 
his contemporaries.20 Locke’s work did not appear remarka-
ble to his contempories because the ideas it expressed, albeit 
very well written and organized, were not viewed as novel. In 
this case, unlike the indifference accorded to the contempo-
rary reception of other innovative philosophical works, the 
prevailing judgment was not a case of ‘too radical, profoundly 
mistaken, or incomprehensible,’ so much as a case of ‘well 
written, but not very remarkable.’ Analytical bibliography is 
able to demonstrate that Locke’s work did not give rise to any 
detailed critical replies in print before the year 1703, and there 
was no systematic refutation of it at all until 1705 with the ap-
pearance of Charles Leslie’s Rehearsal and the Anonymous 
Essay Upon Government.21 
 Part of the reason for this, surmised by Martyn Thomp-
son, was due to the unremarkable nature of many of Locke’s 
claims and arguments when viewed against the contextual 
background of English political writing during the latter part of 
the 17th century. (The pamphleteers of the period popularized 
much of the Whiggish stock of political ideas, as they fer-
mented in the political atmosphere of the time). While the Two 
Treatises is now taken as the best articulation of classic Eng-
lish (and North American) liberal political theory, 
contemporaries saw James Tyrrell’s Patriarcha non Monar-
cha, or The Patriarch Un-monarch’d (1681), James 
Harrington’s The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), Henry 
Neville’ s Plato Redivivus (1681), and George Lawson’s Polit-
ica Sacra et Civilis, or, A Modell of Civil and Ecclesiasticall 
Government (1660), as more effective justifications for the 
general Whig position on constitutional affairs. All of these au-
thors, like Locke, were concerned in the first instance to 
                                                                
20 Martyn P. Thompson, “Reception of Locke’s Two Treatises of Govern-
ment, 1690-1705,” Political Studies 24(2) (1976): 189-204. 
21 Ibid. 
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provide a detailed refutation of Filmer’s absolutist position 
(due to his popular influence), and they all then branched out 
to analyze and assess general issues of liberal political the-
ory—consent, social contract, limitations on power, 
representative government, and so on.22 
 An article written by B.A. MacLean, is particularly inter-
esting in this regard, concerned, as it is, with the intellectual 
dependency of ideas, and raises a key question concerning 
Locke’s familiarity with the work of George Lawson, an Angli-
can cleric. MacLean argued that if a reader were to make a 
detailed textual comparison between Lawson’s Politica and 
Locke’s Two Treatises, the reader would be struck by the 
many similarities of principles and arguments advanced by 
both texts. The conclusion, for MacLean, is that Locke must 
have read and studied Lawson, and was directly influenced 
by him as he drew up the structure he used for the subsequent 
composition of the Two Treatises.23 
 
Challenging Professional Myths 
The rarefied view that we have of Locke, as the brilliant ex 
nihilo creator of classical liberal political theory, is decidedly 
broadsided by MacLean’s assessment of Locke. Locke cre-
ated his text upon the foundation of crucial preliminary work 
done by another theorist of the period. There is, however, 
much work to be done in advancing this kind of analysis of 
key thinkers against the contextual background of ideas that 
influenced them in their philosophical writings. Apart from 
MacLean’s article, for example, I have been unable to trace 
very much in the way of work done by philosophers in the An-
glo-American tradition that systematically attempts to assess 
the creative novelty of Locke’s political writing against the 
background of his lesser known predecessors or contempo-
raries.24 The comparative lack of scholarly output, here, I 
think, is related to the non-generation of a sufficient critical 
                                                                
22 James Farr and Clayton Roberts, “John Locke and the Glorious Revolu-
tion,” The Historical Journal 28(2) (1985): 385-98. 
23 A. H. MacLean, “George Lawson and John Locke,” Cambridge Historical 
Journal 9(1) (1947): 69-77. 
24 An exception that I have not been able to assess, but looks very promis-
ing, is Conal Condren’s George Lawson’s ‘Politica’ and the English 
Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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mass of interest in the academy, inhabited, as it is, by a pro-
fessional cadre of analytical philosophers who are haunted 
still by the ghost of Immanuel Kant, and who still seek to rep-
licate, in the minds of their students, their indifference 
towards, or even open hostility to, contextualist approaches 
to the study of philosophical thinkers and their concepts. 
 The indifference or hostility to the kind of method that I 
have been arguing for, has itself an historical basis in the way 
that philosophy as a profession has developed over the last 
150 years in Anglo-American philosophical culture (though 
the reception of contextualist approaches to the study of phi-
losophy has been rather more popular in continental Europe); 
a profession with its own mythology of inculturation passed on 
from one generation of professional philosopher to another as 
the initiated in turn become the future initiators. It entails 
claims of ‘respectability’ concerning what philosophers as pro-
fessionals are essentially about and do, contra many claims 
associated with its messy and ‘disreputable’ past. An implied 
principle of the analytical credo is the belief that an ‘us’ versus 
‘them’ gulf emerged between traditional philosophers and pro-
fessional analytic philosophers such that what emerged was 
not simply some new set of concerns for philosophy, new var-
iations, so to speak, on past themes, but what was virtually 
tantamount to a new discipline of inquiry. 
 Analytical philosophers looked to an idealized Kant as 
their model for the professional code of the philosopher, a 
thinker who was prepared to slash and burn away the obfus-
cations of the past with the two torches of logic and analytical 
rigor. Kant, it is held, established not just the purity of reason 
itself, but also the purity of philosophy as an autonomous dis-
cipline. Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Fichte, and much 
German philosophy of the 19th century, betrayed the legacy of 
their intellectual father who had rescued them from the jumble 
of confusing philosophy with sophistry, with pseudo-science, 
with metaphysics, or with religion (German philosophy, ac-
cording to the folklore of Anglo-American philosophers, is still 
caught in this legacy of ‘corruption,’ by engaging in ‘incautious 
speculation’). 
 The belief, so it goes, that Anglo-American philosophers 
managed to preserve themselves against ‘German’ 
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decadence, was due to their faithful adherence to Kant’s so-
bering lessons. Philosophers adhering to this tradition were, 
in short, Kant’s orthodox disciples. They inherited Kant’s man-
tle. At the turn of the 20th century, commitment to orthodox 
Kantian rigor, with its support for logic and analytical methods, 
came to faithful fruition in the form of logical positivism, exem-
plified, for example, in the thought of Bertrand Russell and the 
thought of the early Wittgenstein—philosophy without a 
past— pure thought without the taint of historically distorting 
influence—in short, an infallible method for establishing in-
contestable, if somewhat unexciting, truths about the world. 
 This kind of professional myth about the calling of a pro-
fession, outlined above, still inhabits the environs of many 
academies, at least, the corridors inhabited by many Anglo-
American philosophers. The myth still exudes a powerful ide-
ological force, shaping professional dispositions, even though 
the promised land of logical positivism, the new philosophical 
Jerusalem, has been rejected by some of their ‘wayward’ chil-
dren who now stand estranged. 
 If greater inroads are to be made in the contextualist 
study of philosophy, in Great Britain or the United States, then 
greater efforts will be need to be expended by the ‘new evan-
gelists’ of the contextualist message in order to help seed the 
academy and produce a new crop of academic philosophers 
who are receptive to the validly of such an approach to philo-
sophical inquiry. 
 If a gradual change in the ‘historical consciousness’ of 
the academic philosopher in the Anglo-American tradition 
were to occur, on a wider scale, then the first signs of this 
growing movement would likely be seen in a change to the 
curriculum for the teaching of philosophy, whereby courses in 
historical method would be required for the training of philos-
ophers. Students would need to be come aware of the kinds 
of tools of approach needed to avoid the cavalier attitude of 
misrepresenting past texts for present ideological purposes, 
or of anachronistically imposing on a past thinker views that 
would not have been seriously entertained by them. 
 Careful attention to historical context is a powerful coun-
ter corrective to the temptation to claim the reputation of a 
past thinker, when it is not warranted, as an ally in present 
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discourse. Locke did not write his Two Treatises to persuade 
Adam Smith or Robert Nozick of the supreme merits of a min-
imalist state, or to launch the careers of John Jacques 
Rousseau or Karl Marx. He wrote to those individuals, then 
living, who would be willing and able to read him and who, if 
persuaded, would help him accomplish the political (and 
other) ends for which he labored in the writing of the Two Trea-
tises. Above all, an awareness of interpreting a text 
contextually would expose students to pseudo-historical-in-
terpretations—to the past works of analytical philosophers 
that claim to be, on the face of it, historical accounts of the 
thoughts of a given thinker. 
 Secondly, we would also expect to see a significant in-
crease in historically aware output as reflected in the 
traditional philosophical journals of Anglo-American philoso-
phy—Analysis, Mind, Journal of Philosophy, etc. If the 
profession is to become more receptive to the goals of textual 
analysis, then this ought, in due course, to be reflected in the 
publications appearing in those professional journals, journals 
that have hitherto been key gate keeping sources, shoring up 
the mythical concept-ualization of analytical philosophy’s own 
understanding of the philosophical past. 
 Thirdly, more downstream, the undergraduate literature 
would also start to reflect a change in method, for that sub-
genre of the philosophical literature, the standard student text-
book on the history of philosophy, would begin to be 
substantially revised in order to reflect this shift in methodo-
logical allegiance. The existing array of textbooks relied upon 
in instruction would become less useful for pedagogical pur-
poses. In Anglophone academic culture, introductory 
textbooks play a prominent role in the education of students. 
No philosophy professor can be assumed to have firsthand 
knowledge if all relevant philosophical thought. However, 
what really helps to differentiate a good from a bad introduc-
tory textbook, is the fact that a good textbook, paradoxically, 
tends to be subversive of the genre of textbook writing in gen-
eral. Janet Coleman’s recent two volume narrative on political 
philosophy, from Antiquity to the Renaissance is, I think, an 
excellent example of such a textbook, an ‘anti-textbook,’ that 
is subversive of the standard genre of philosophical textbooks 
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with their worn allegiances to the ideas of the great philoso-
phers padded out with some human interest stories.25 
Excellent examples of such textbooks may be more common 
place in other disciplines, but they are not, at least according 
to the author’s experience, common place in philosophy. Col-
man’s book is an example of the genre at its best, and 
demonstrates how a textbook can be non-trivial, subtle, and 
nuanced, while also engaging in the valuable expository task 
of presenting often very difficult ideas in a form appropriate to 
a ‘fledgling’ audience of readers. 
 
Conclusion 
Professional philosophers, as a breed, tend to trail behind on 
the coattails of other disciplines as far as their ability to appro-
priate useful research tools, for their own work, is concerned. 
This problem is exacerbated when the question becomes one 
of developing resources for an approach to philosophy that 
analytical philosophy itself has been disinterested in, or even 
openly hostile towards, namely, the contextual analysis of 
philosophical texts. 
 Here, I think, technological developments in the elec-
tronic storage, retrieval, manipulation, and analysis of text-
based sources, offers considerable potential for advancing 
the goal of cultivating an historically aware approach to the 
treatment of philosophical texts. Scholars have long had ac-
cess to and array of print editions of scholarly works of the 
past. Yet, these editions tend to be of the canonical works of 
philosophers who are already heralded as being worthy ob-
jects of study. Critical scholarly editions of the works of many 
past thinkers, works that contextually inform the political, so-
cial and cultural milieu of a past era, may not be available for 
consultation, thus creating a barrier to the kind of research for 
which this paper has been arguing. 
 Contextual based approaches place a much higher de-
mand on the researcher for access to primary source 
materials than non-historical treatments. If a text is located on 
                                                                
25 Janet Coleman, A History of Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000). 
Vol. 1 From ancient Greece to early Christianity; vol. 2 From the Middle 
Ages to the Renaissance. 
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a bibliographical source and cannot be lent to a borrower via 
inter-library loan, then the classic method of approach, espe-
cially for rare or older material, has been to travel to the sites 
where the sources reside and to assess them in situ. This can 
be very time-consuming process and can demand considera-
ble financial resources to undertake such programs of travel. 
While the development of print culture, and the development 
of great libraries, has lessened the need to travel as exten-
sively and as frequently as the medieval scholars of the past 
were required to do, these burdens may not be inconsidera-
ble. Travel also presupposes that permission by the institution 
that has custody of a text, in order to examine and hopefully 
copy it, will be granted in the first place (not something that 
can be automatically assumed). 
 On the basis of my own work on John Locke, my studies 
have been hampered by my inability to have ready access to 
manuscript collections and to rare book collections, mainly in 
England (Bodleian Library, Oxford, and the British Library, 
London). The development of an electronic library of re-
sources, benefiting from the advantage of distributed access 
over the internet, promises to be a fruitful way of connecting 
scholars to the primary textual materials they need in order to 
advance their context-based research. 
 Standards have been developing in the storage and re-
trieval of full text documents. There has been a trend away 
from merely using information technology for the provision of 
bibliographic data about primary sources (important as this 
is), to the provision of access to the full text itself. While there 
are many organizational and institutional issues surrounding 
questions of who pays for the creation and the maintenance 
of electronic resources on the internet, it is not impossible to 
envisage a future in which scholar entrepreneurs in philoso-
phy may emerge and help push forward a research agenda 
that includes a commitment to the development of digital li-
brary resources for scholarly research into the history of 
philosophy. 
 At present, there are a number of web sites that provide 
access to classic philosophical texts (often in poor transla-
tions that are outside copyright)—Plato’s Republic, Aristotle’s 
Ethics, Hobbes’ Leviathan, Locke’s Second Treatise, etc. 
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There is, however, little or no coverage of less well-known fig-
ures in philosophy (or of other disciplines) who have written 
works of direct interest to the research of the historically 
aware philosopher. In the paper above, I have mentioned sev-
eral thinkers writing in 17th century political philosophy that 
would be excellent candidates for digitization so that scholars 
can have ease of access to accurate reproductions of these 
texts. This list, without too much difficulty, could be very con-
siderably extended. 
 Digitization, as a medium of communication, offers the 
scholar more exiting prospects than just the accurate digital 
representation of a text as a surrogate for being able to look 
directly at the original text (important as this is). Microform, 
despite its comparative inconvenience of use compared to 
online digital library access, has been able to provide accu-
rate reproductions of primary documents for several decades. 
The additional advantage afforded by the digitization of pri-
mary sources is centered on the ability of information retrieval 
systems to search through a large corpus of texts in order to 
locate the context for the relational use of many words and 
phrases. Many authors, can, with ease, search very rapidly 
through a corpus of texts using the techniques of Boolean 
searching, proximity searching, and incidence ranking in or-
der to locate key terms. This is potentially a very fruitful way 
of locating and comparing the different contexts for the use of 
a particular word or phrases denoting an idea, and how its use 
may have been subtly adapted, changed, or augmented by 
different thinkers over the years. 
 In my own research on the historically conditioned con-
ception of ‘suicide,’ for example, by making use of text based 
electronic searching capabilities, I have been able to make 
some very profitable connections revealing many anachronis-
tic usages of the term, thereby exposing the foisting of present 
definitions onto past usages without regard to differences in 
meaning.26 
 The moral of this story may be obvious, but it is still well 
worth stating in bold terms: the greater the resource base at 
                                                                
26 Dan Kolak, The Philosophy Source. 100 Classic Masterworks on CD-
ROM. 
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the disposal of a scholar, the greater will be the fruits of this 
kind of comparative analysis, reinforcing the need for a 
properly contextualized understanding of philosophical 
ideas.27 
 Pioneering interpreters, who utilize these technological 
opportunities, who seek to examine the contextual settings 
out of which past intellectual thought emerged, challenge the 
cozy picture of the hagiographical history of philosophy dis-
cussed in the introduction. They render an eminently useful 
service to philosophical inquiry. They enhance our capacity to 
view the world as our historically rooted thinkers viewed it, 
with all the social, cultural, and ideological issues that they 
faced, brought into sharper focus. Once we have grasped the 
issues that a given thinker’s age confronted, and the kinds of 
conflicts those issues invited, then we can, with greater in-
sight, interpret the meaning of a philosophical text that a given 
thinker bequeathed to posterity. 
                                                                
27 Craig Paterson, “Suicide, Assisted Suicide, and Euthanasia,” International 
Philosophical Quarterly 43(3) (2003): 351-58. 
